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NOTES
THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984:
INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
SAFEGUARDS
INTRODUCTION
When we stand before a broken child and ask what we
should do or avoid doing, we also stand before ourselves and
before the civilization we both reflect and shape.'
Each year approximately 30,000 severely handicapped infants are born
in the United States.' The handicaps with which these children are born
range from myelomingocele (spina bifada)3 and Down's Syndrome' to
anecephal.5 In significant numbers, handicapped infants have been denied
I. Beck, On Withholding Treatment: A Working Paper for the Professional Standard
and Practice Council of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, 1978 Canadian Psychiatric
Associatin Position Paper 10a.
2. See Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival, 1974: Hearings on the Examination of
the Moral and Ethical Problems Faced with the Agonizing Decision of Life and Death Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong. 2d
Sess. 26 (1974).
3. Spina Bifada with myelomingocele is an open defect in the spine and associated
structures, and occurs in up to 4 infants per 1,000 births. W. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIAT-
RICS 1412-14 (R. McKay & V. Vaughan 10th ed. 1975). The condition causes various degrees
of permanent paralysis and deformity. Mental retardation accompanies this condition in fifty
percent of the cases, and hydrocephalus (a gross enlargement of the cranium caused by ac-
cumulation of fluid in the brain) develops in ninety percent of the cases. Id.
4. Down's Syndrome, also known as mongolism or trisomy 21 syndrome, occurs in
approximately 1.5 infants per 1,000 births and is accompanied by various degrees of retarda-
tion and personality disorders. W. NELSON, supra note 3, at 134-37. As a result of recent
improvements in the education and training of people with Down's Syndrome, many of those
afflicted with the condition are now able to live fairly normal, productive lives. See also, Ellis,
Letting Defective Babies Die, Who Decides?, 7 Am. J.L. & MED. 393, 396-97 (1982).
5. This condition, which occurs in I out of every 1,000 births, is the partial or total
absence of brain. So severe is this condition that one medico-legal dictionary terms encepha-
ous "a fetal monster without a brain." B. MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 49
(1960). Medical intervention possibly could sustain life, but the sort of life sustained is difficult
to imagine with all or substantial portions of the brain missing. Cognitive function, if at all
present, would be minimal. Ellis, supra note 4, at 397.
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immediate life-saving treatment.'
The withholding of immediate medical treatment from handicapped in-
fants has spawned prolonged debate in the legal7 and medical8 communi-
ties. In response, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 were signed into
law.' The Amendments mandate that infants born with handicaps which
endanger their lives are entitled to immediate life-saving treatment. 10 The
Amendments, however, allow physicians, exercising competent medical
judgment, to withhold treatment from a handicapped infant in three situa-
tions: (1) when the infant is chronically comatose; (2) when treatment
would prolong dying; (3) when treatment would be inhumane. The infants
6. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVID-
UAL ABILITIES 35 (1983).
7. Annas, Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment for Minors, 23 J. FAM. L. 217 (1984);
Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technological
and Medical Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980); Ellis, Letting Defective
Babies Die. Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982); Horan, Euthanasia, Medical
Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment of Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
76 (1975); Kelsey, Which Infants Should Live, Who Should Die?, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
5 (Apr. 1975); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1974); Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Consid-
erations, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 333 (1977); Note, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of
Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV. 889 (1984); Note, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application
of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 569 (1983).
8. Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with Meningomyelocele in
INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 69 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan eds. 1982);
Diamond, The Deformed Child's Right to Life, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 127 (D.
Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977); Koop, Ethical and Surgical Considerations in the Case of the
Newborn with Congenital Abnormalities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN
89 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan eds. 1982); Black, Selective Treatment of Infants with My-
elomingocele, 5 NEUROSURGERY 334 (1979); Campbell & Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas
in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Johnson, Selective Non-
Treatment and Spina Bifada: A Case Study in Ethical Theory and Application, 3 BIOETHICS
Q. 91 (1981); Lorber, Spina Bifada: To Treat or Not to Treat? Selection-The Best Policy
Available, 147 NURSING MIRROR 14 (1978); McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma
of Modern Medicine, 339 J.A.M.A. 172 (1974); Shaw, Dilemma of "Informed Consent" in
Children, 2389 NEW ENG. J. MED. 885 (1973); Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes About
Neonatal Death, I I HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (Dec. 1981).
9. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit. I, secs. 121-28, 98
Stat. 1749, 1752-55 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5103 (Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Child
Abuse Amendments].
10. Id. at § 5102(B)(3). Section 5102(B)(3) states in part:
(3) the term 'withholding of medically indicated treatment' means the failure to
respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including ap-
propriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which in the treating physician or physi-
cians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all such conditions. ...
Id.
II. Id. Section 5102(B)(3) states in part:
(3) [E]xcept that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other
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included within each exception are not protected by binding enforcement
procedures'2 and consequently will be allowed to die.'" As a result of inade-
quate procedural due process safeguards, the Amendments have proven in-
effective in protecting the handicapped infant. 4 The Amendments imperil
the life of the newborn. The newborn's life far outweighs the government's
interest in curtailing fiscal and administrative costs.15 As such, more effec-
tive procedural safeguards are warranted.
Initially, this note will review the interests involved in the decision to
withhold immediate life-saving medical treatment from a handicapped in-
fant. Next, the past regulations and their enforcement procedures will be
examined and compared with the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. Fi-
nally, the note will analyze the handicapped infant's constitutional right to
procedural due process and will propose suggestions for legislative reform to
effectuate this constitutional right.
COMPETING RIGHTS AND INTEREST
In significant numbers, disabled newborns have been denied immediate
medical treatment.' e For example, on April 9, 1982, "Infant Doe" was born
in Bloomington, Indiana.' 7 The infant needed surgery to correct a blocked
esophagus and thereby allow food to reach his stomach.1 8 "Infant Doe's"
parents refused immediate life-saving treatment. 9 Six days later the infant
than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating
physician or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and
irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dy-
ing, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all the infant's life-threatening con-
ditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of survival of the infant; or (C) the provision
of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the
treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id.
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (Supp. 1986). See also Bopp & Balch, The Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 and their Implementing Regulations: A Summary, 2 ISSUES IN LAW &
MED. 91, 123 (1985).
13. See infra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 59-72 and accom-
panying text.
15. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16. See supra note 6.
17. In re Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A, slip op. at 2
(Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition, de-
nied, sub nom State of Indiana ex rel Infant Doe v. Monroe Circuit Court, No. 482 S 140
(Ind. Apr. 14, 1982), appeal dismissed, sub nom. In re Guardianship of Infant Doe, No. 1-782
A 157 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1983), petition for transfer denied, No. 1-782 A 157 (Ind. June
15, 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394.
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. Id.
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died.20
The following year, under the "Oklahoma Experiment," twenty-four
infants born with spina bifada were denied immediate medical treatment on
the basis of a "quality of life" evaluation.2 ' The "quality of life" evaluation
was based on arbitrary socio-economic criteria, rather than medical crite-
ria.2 2 Within thirty-seven days the twenty-four infants died."
In most cases, parents have a right to make fundamental decisions with
regard to their children's care.24 However, if the parents fail to care for the
child, the state will intervene to protect the child. 25 In some cases, when
parents have refused life-saving medical treatment for their child, the state
has intervened2 6 to ensure the infant's constitutional right to life.2 7 More-
over, courts have overruled parent's medical decisions even where the situa-
tion is not life-threatening.28 As such, the parent's decision-making power is
20. Baby's Death Brings End to Court Battle, The Evansville Courier, Apr. 16, 1982,
at I, col. 3.
21. Gross, Cox, Tatyrek, Pollay, & Barnes, Early Management and Decision Making
for Treatment of Myelomingocele, 72 PEDIATRIcs 450, 455 (1983). An article which describes
a five-year experiment conducted by staff of the Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Pediat-
rics, Neurosurgery and Urology of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center and
staff of the Department of Social Service, Oklahoma Children's Memorial Hospital, Oklahoma
City.
22. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
23. See Gross, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (right of privacy extends to cer-
tain aspects of family relationship); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish
to educate their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to
choose parochial schools over public schools).
25. In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (1962). See also Brandt,
Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV.
337, 362-63 (1981).
26. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. I, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), affid, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (ordering blood transfusions where parent was a
Jehovah's Witness who refused to consent to a transfusion); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass.
733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (ordering chemotherapy for leukemia-stricken child over paren-
tal objections); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971) (ordering transfusions for a 22-year old comatose patient over parental objections).
27. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court held that from "the moment of
live birth there exists a human being entitled to the fullest protection of the law and the most
basic rights enjoyed by every human being." Id. See also the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments' guarantee of a person's right to life. The fifth amendment states: "No person
shall . . . be deprived of life . . . without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fourteenth amendment requires the same guarantees to be provided by states. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § I. The right to life might otherwise be guaranteed by the ninth amend-
ment. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny,
or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
28. Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (court proscribed
treatment in second Chad Green case).
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tempered by the state's interest in the child's welfare."9
The balancing of these interests is further complicated by the conflict-
ing views held by the medical profession."0 Some physicians argue that
before a handicapped infant is treated, several factors must be examined. 3'
These factors include the patient's physical attributes and I.Q., the parent's
income and I.Q., and the government's contribution for immediate surgery
and life-maintenance.32 Under this scheme, if the patient's resources are too
low and the resources required of the government are too high, treatment is
denied."3 As physicians themselves concede, the handicapped infant's future
is indeed uncertain under this formulation.3"
Other physicians advocate that the decision to withhold treatment
should be based on a "sanctity of life" system of ethics and are positive
about the infant's future.38 These physicians argue that children born with
spina bifada and Down's Syndrome should be given immediate treatment
because no valid criteria exists for the selection of infants36 and because
there is no way to accurately predict the future health and mental abilities
of the child.3 7 In any event, these physicians feel that the decision to with-
hold life-saving treatment should not rest with the medical community.38
29. See supra notes 25-28.
30. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
31. The recommendation made by the myelomeningocele team in "Oklahoma Experi-
ment" for either vigorous treatment or supportive care (i.e., no active treatment) was primarily
made by applying a formula developed by Shaw for assessing the quality of life for an infant.
Shaw, Defining the Quality of Life, 7 HAsTINGs CENTER REP. 11 (1977). The Shaw formula
described in Gross, supra note 21, at 456, is as follows: "QL = NE x (H + S); QL is quality
of life, NE represents the patient's natural endowment, both physical and intellectual; H is the
contribution from home and family: and S is the contribution from society." Gross, supra note
21, at 456.
32. Gross, supra note 21, at 456.
33. See Gross, supra note 21, at 455.
34. Id. See also Dr. Raymond Duff, Department of Pediatrics, Yale-New Haven Hos-
pital, CBS Morning News, May 18, 1982. "What nature or God has created extremely imper-
fectly should be left alone and go back to nature." Id.
35. McLone, Letters to the Editor: Care of Infants with Myelomeningocele, 74 PEDI-
ATRICS 162, 163 (1984).
In our hands prompt treatment of unselected patients with myelomingocele ensures
that 85% survive, and of the surviving children 73% have normal intelligence, 74.5% are
community ambulators, and 85% are continent of urine on clean intermediate
catherization.
Id.
36. Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with Meningomyelocele, in
INFANTICIDE 69, 74 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan, eds. 1982). See also McLone, Results of
Treatment of Children Born with Myelomingocele, 30 CLINICAL NEUROSURGERY 407 (1983).
37. Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with Meningomyelocele at
70.
38. Beck, supra note I, at 5a. "The aspiration of our profession has always been to
spare no effort in our attempt to prevent illness, to promote healing, to reduce suffering and to
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As a result of the conflict between the parents, the state, and the medi-
cal community, the handicapped infant's future is not certain. While in
some cases courts have upheld the infant's constitutional right to life, 9 in
others, the parent's right to make decisions with respect to their children's
medical treatment has remained paramount.' Some physicians actively
treat all disabled newborns,"' while other physicians only treat infants who
meet a socio-economic criteria."2 In reaction to this disparity of treatment
for the disabled newborn, the "Baby Doe" regulations were passed to pro-
hibit discrimination against handicapped infants. 43
PAST REGULATIONS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Despite the medical community's suggestion that the decision to with-
hold treatment be left to parents and physicians, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) issued the "Baby Doe" regulations. 44 The "In-
fant Doe" case prompted the President to direct HHS to take administra-
tive action on behalf of the handicapped infants denied immediate medical
treatment.4" The first notice HHS issued to health care providers was a flat
prohibition against unlawful withholding of nutritional sustenance or re-
save lives .... The physician must be on the side of his patient. This is his traditional role,
and this is his only role."
Id.
39. See supra note 27.
40. See supra note 24.
41. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 21, 31 and 34 and accompanying text.
43. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Off. of the Sec'y., Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped
Infants, 40 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985) (hereinafter Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations]. These
regulations were struck down on June II, 1984, in a suit brought by the American Hospital
Association. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). That
federal district court ruling was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on December
27, 1984. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, No. 84-6211 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1984). Both
courts regarded themselves as bound by an earlier Second Circuit ruling which had held that
"[clongress never contemplated that Section 504 would apply to treatment decisions of this
nature." United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d. Cir. 1984). The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision striking down the Section 504
Baby Doe regulations on June 17, 1985. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, 53 U.S.L.W. 3881
(June 17, 1985). The United States Supreme Court held that the district court and the court
of appeals correctly held that the investigative actions by the Dep't of Health and Human
Services were not authorized by the Rehabilitation Act and that the regulations which purport
to authorize a continuation of them are invalid. Bowen v. American Hosp., 106 S. Ct. 2101
(1986).
44. Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations at § 84.55.
45. Presidential memorandum to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health
and Human Services (April 30, 1982) (On the Enforcement of Federal Laws Prohibiting Dis-
crimination Against the Handicapped).
[Vol. 21
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quired medical treatment from disabled infants."6 Although the medical
profession criticized the notice, HHS reminded hospitals receiving financial
aid that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197347 applied to disabled
infants.
The second version of the regulations decreased the protection for dis-
abled newborns under Section 504.48 While Section 504 prohibits discrimi-
nation against disabled infants on the basis of handicap, "medical deci-
sions" by parents and physicians to withhold treatment were outside the
section's scope.49 Rather, Section 504 only applied when "non-medical"
quality of life considerations, such as handicap, persuaded parents and doc-
tors to withhold treatment.5 0
The final version of the regulations" gave more discretionary power to
parents and doctors in the decision-making process5 2 and less protection for
the handicapped infant. The new "Baby Doe" regulations required an in-
fant to receive immediate life-saving treatment only when it was in the
"reasonable medical judgment" of the physician or the judgment of a hospi-
tal review committee.58 The HHS could only outline guidelines for the re-
view committees. 54 In as much as this medical standard was vague and ar-
46. Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services, Discrimination
Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care
Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (June 16, 1982) (notice issued May 18, 1982, applying 45
C.F.R. § 84 to health services for handicapped children) [hereinafter Notice]. The notice
states in part:
[lit is unlawful . . . to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition if: (I) the
withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap
does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated.
Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Section 504 states in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. ...
Id. at § 504.
48. Office of the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Nondiscrimi-
nation on the Basis of Handicap Relation to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed.
Reg. 30846 (July 5, 1983) (proposed rule modifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.61) [hereinafter Proposed
Rule].
49. Id. at 30847. The Secretary said, "Section 504 does not compel medical personnel
to attempt to perform impossible futile acts of therapies . . . which merely temporarily pro-
long the process of dying. Id. at 30846.
50. Id.
51. Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations, supra note 43.
52. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.55(b)(3), (4) (1985).
53. Id.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(f) (1985). (The Infant Care Review Committees were not gov-
ernmentally controlled.)
1986]
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bitrary,65 the "Baby Doe" regulations decreased the protection for the
disabled newborn.
As a result of the vague "reasonable medical judgment" standard, the
"Baby Doe" regulations authorized HHS to activate a special investigative
unit." Also, the "Baby Doe" regulations required the state child abuse
agencies to establish procedures57 to report instances of discrimination
against disabled newborns. Unfortunately, the investigative unit and the re-
porting procedures did not prove effective in prohibiting the denial of life-
saving medical treatment for infants based on their handicap."
HHS not only failed to activate the special enforcement unit,5 9 HHS
also failed to respond to reports of cases of treatment denial.6" Instead of
immediate enforcement action, the new investigative office was changed to
a research program to develop information on civil rights.61 Reported cases
of treatment denial continue to be listed by HHS as under investigation. 62
Therefore, HHS had little effect on the denial of life-saving treatment for
disabled infants.6"
55. Id.
56. 45 C.F.R. § 84, App. C(b) (1985).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c) (1985).
58. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
59. Medical Battle Lines are Drawn, Sherwood Series in the Wash. Times, July, 1984,
at 5, col. 4. "Traditionally the Department of Health and Human Services has been run by
and for the medical community, with doctors and hospital administrators in key positions
throughout the agency." Id. See also Infighting Results in Retreat, Sherwood Series in the
Wash. Times, July, 1984, at 13, col. 2:
Records and interviews also demonstrate that, at the same time Mrs. Heckler, Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services, was promising to rigorously en-
force federal regulations, she failed to activate a special 'Baby Doe' investigative
unit-reversing her own earlier decisions and the recommendations of the U.S. Surgeon
General that an 'autonomous' investigative office was necessary to enforcement.
Id.
60. Weakest Protection for Weakest of Weak, Sherwood Series in the Wash. Times,
July, 1984, at 4, col. I.
In the two years the Department of Health and Human Services has been keeping
files on reported nontreatment of handicapped infants, at least 200 cases have been re-
ferred to the federal government for action, in many cases by hospital personnel. More
than half of those reported incidents-some two years old and involving reports of starva-
tion and injection deaths--continue to be listed by the Department of Health and Human
Services as under investigation. So far, no doctor or hospital has been prosecuted by the
federal government for depriving a handicapped child medical care.
Id.
61. Infighting Results in Retreat, Sherwood Series in the Wash. Times, July, 1984, at
14, col. 4.
62. See Sherwood, supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. Gerry, The Civil Rights of Handicapped Infants: An Oklahoma "Experiment", I
ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 55, 55-57 (1985). The Department of Health and Human Services
Office of Civil Rights took ninety-four days for the development of an investigative plan into
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2011], Art. 5
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Unfortunately, the state child abuse agencies have not proven to be
any more effective than HHS in prohibiting discrimination against infants
born in need of immediate medical treatment. There are several reasons
why state child abuse agencies have been less than effective in pursuing the
interests of the handicapped infants."' In some instances, the agency per-
sonnel may agree with the "quality of life" judgments underlying non-treat-
ment"6 and in other cases they do not have the time or expertise to properly
contest such practices."' Also, the state child abuse agencies are custom-
arily in a mutually supportive relationship with the medical profession .
The medical profession is responsible for reports of child neglect and
abuse. 8 Therefore, the adversary position fostered by the "Baby Doe" reg-
ulations places the agency in a very awkward position. 6" Consequently, the
agencies have not proven effective in protecting the disabled infant from
discrimination.
Finally, the hospital review committees, authorized as voluntary advi-
sory groups to protect the disabled newborn from treatment denial, have
not been effective in prohibiting discrimination." In fact, they are often the
discriminating party.7 1 The review committees frequently base their deci-
sion on misinformation . 7  Also, the review committee's decision may be
the deaths of handicapped infants in the Oklahoma experiment. The order barring federal
investigation was not entered until 105 days following receipt of the February 24, 1984, com-
plaint. See also Complaints to Agencies Rarely Result in Action, Sherwood Series in the
Wash. Times, July, 1984, at 12, col. I.
Even the original 'Baby Doe' case, the first to be filed with the federal government
following the April 1982 death of a Down's Syndrome infant in a Bloomington, Indiana
hospital remains officially unresolved. The Department of Health and Human Services
records state, 'Final administrative action has not yet been taken.'
Id. at 12, col. 1.
64. Statement of the Role of Child Protective Services Agencies in Cases Involving
Denial of Health Care of Handicapped Infants, Resolution of the National Council of State
Public Welfare Administrators of the American Public Welfare Association, May 11, 1984.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Bopp & Balch, supra note 12, at 104.
68. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.55(b)(3), (4) (1985).
69. Bopp & Balch, supra note 12, at 104.
70. See Gross, supra note 21, at 452. The decision not to treat handicapped infants
based on a "quality of life equation" in the Oklahoma experiment was made by a "myelom-
ingocele team." The team consisted of a physician's assistant (a full-time program coordina-
tor), a pediatrician, an orthopedist, a neurosurgeon, a urologist, a nurse clinician, a social
worker, physical and occupational therapists, and a psychologist. Id.
71. Id.
72. Remarks by J. Robertson and N. Fost, at the First National Conference on Hospi-
tal Ethics Committees, sponsored by Concern for Dying and the American Society of Law &
Medicine, in Washington, D.C. (May 1983), discussed in Annas, Refusal of Lifesaving Treat-
ment for Minors, 23 J. FAM. L. 217, 228 (1984-85); See also American Academy of Pediat-
rics, Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Committees (1984), discussed in Annas, Ethics Commit-
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grounded on a structural, mathematical formula called a "quality of life
equation. 17 3 One such hospital review committee made the decision to treat
handicapped infants in the "Oklahoma Experiment" 74 based on a "quality
of life formula." The actual formula was QL = NE x (H + S). 7 1 QL is
quality of life, NE is the patient's physical attributes and I.Q., H. is the
parent's financial status, and S is the cost to society.76 The "Oklahoma
Team" demonstrated that an infant born in need of immediate life-saving
treatment, such as spina bifada, who requires sac closure surgery to prevent
a fatal infection, will die if surgery is not performed and antibiotics are not
administered.7 7 The "Oklahoma Team" was unconcerned with the survival
rate of sixty-seven percent of the same infants if treatment was not based
on a "quality of life formula" and the infants were given active treatment.7 8
The hospital review committee dismisses criticism of this type with
public policy arguments.79 They justify the use of the formula, 80 so heavily
dependent on assessment of prejudicial criterion,81 by examining the long-
term case of the spina bifada infant. 82 The "Oklahoma Team" stresses the
increased pressure families undergo in raising a disabled infant. 3 In addi-
tion, they emphasize the possibility of an unavailability of government
funding for the infant's future care.84 Therefore, the "Oklahoma Team"
does not tell the families of the criteria used by the hospital review commit-
tee to arrive at its decision for or against treatment.85 They argue that a
decision based on socio-economic criteria actually relieves low-income fami-
lies of false hope for the future.86 The hospital review committees have not
proven effective in prohibiting discrimination against disabled infants.
tees in Neonatal Care: Substantive Protection or Procedural Diversion?, 7 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 843 (1984).
73. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
74. See Gross, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
76. See Gross, supra note 21, at 456.
77. See Gross, supra note 21, at 455.
The *untreated survivor' has not been a significant problem in our experience. All 24
babies who have not been treated at all have died at an average of 37 days .... Four of
the six babies for whom nontreatment was suggested but was rejected by the parents are
still alive. . . . One of the infants treated 'late' at four months of age is still alive but in
crisis management.
Id.
78. See Gross, supra note 21, at 456.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. See Gross, supra note 21, at 456.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Gross, supra note 21, at 455.
86. Id.
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As a result of the failure of HHS, state child abuse agencies and hospi-
tal-based committees to protect the handicapped infant from discrimina-
tion, the parents and physicians are allowed wide latitude in making deci-
sions affecting disabled newborns.87 Unfortunately, when parents and
physicians make a decision for or against treatment, they often consider
factors other than the best interests of the infant. The parent and physician
autonomy approach has proven inappropriate because of the circumstances
under which such decisions are usually made.8 8 Parents, emotionally
shocked by the birth of their disabled infant and counseled by unfamiliar
professionals in an unfamiliar hospital environment, often are in no position
to make life or death decisions for their child.8 9 Similarly, a national survey
of physicians has shown that eighty-five percent of the nation's pediatricians
would acquiesce to the parent's desires when the infant was born with a
disability. 0 Only three percent of the physicians surveyed would get a court
order for the necessary surgery over the parent's objections, while eighty-
eight percent would do so if the child was not disabled.9' Therefore, the
decision made by parents and physicians has not always been based on the
disabled infant's best interests. As such, the decision discriminates against
the handicapped infant in need of life-saving treatment.
The "Baby Doe" regulations proved ineffective in protecting the dis-
abled newborn denied immediate medical treatment.9 The regulations de-
creased the protection for handicapped infants93 when they increased the
deference given to parents and physicians in the decision-making process.9"
87. Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations, supra note 43.
88. Diamond, Treatment Versus Non-Treatment for the Handicapped Newborn, in IN-
FANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 55, 62 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan eds. 1982);
Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child with a Severe Congenital Anomaly, 76 PEDIAT-
RICs 321, 322-23 (1981); Sherlock, Selective Non-Treatment of Newborns, 5 J. MED. ETHICS
139 (1979); Waldman, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly Ill Child, 88 J. PEDIAT. 890, 890-
91 (1976); Editorial, Severely Handicapped Infants, 7 J. MED. ETHICS 115 (1981).
89. Gerry, supra note 63, at 21. The child abuse and child neglect laws in every state
have significantly limited the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their chil-
dren, see also Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis,
27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 215 (1975).
The shock of learning that one's child is defective overwhelms parents with grief,
guilt, personal blame, and often hopelessness. They are suddenly confronted with an un-
certain future of financial and psychological hardship, with potential devastating effects
on their marriage, family and personal aspirations. If asked to approve a medical or sur-
gical procedure necessary to keep the child alive ...the parents view life of nominal
interaction and development ...refuse to provide consent.
Id.
90. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, S. Rep. No. 246, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2925.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 60 and 63 and accompanying text.
93. See Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations, supra note 43.
94. Id.
19861
Caulfield: The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984:  Inadequate Procedural Due Pr
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
114 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
The regulations authorized HHS, state child abuse agencies and hospital
review boards to prevent discrimination against handicapped newborns in
the decision-making process.95 The agencies proved ineffective in prohibit-
ing discrimination against the infants.' Despite the ineffectiveness of the
"Baby Doe" enforcement procedures, the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984 authorized the same procedures."7
THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984
Congress has recently enacted the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984,98 federal legislation concerning the withholding of treatment from
disabled infants.' 9 Unfortunately, the Amendments have many of the same
deficiencies as the "Baby Doe" regulations."' The Amendments give the
physician a significant role in the decision-making process."0 ' They also
contain the same enforcement provisions 02 which had proved ineffective in
95. Id
96. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
97. See Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Section 504 Baby Doe Regulations, supra note 43.
101. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note II.
102. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, supra note 9, at § 5103(K). Section 5103(K)
provides, in relevant part:
(K) within one year after Oct. 9, 1984, have in place for the purpose of responding
to the reporting of medical neglect (including instances of withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), procedures or
programs, or both (within the State child protective services system), to provide for (i)
coordination and consultation with individuals designated by and within appropriate
health-care facilities, (ii) prompt notification by individuals designated by and within ap-
propriate health-care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect (including instances
of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threaten-
ing conditions), and (iii) authority, under State law, for the State child protective service
system to pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal proceedings
in a court of competent jurisdiction ...
Id. at § 5103(K).
Section 5103 note (Supp. 1986) states in part:
(a)(I) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 9,
1984], the Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereinafter in this part referred to
as the "Secretary") shall publish proposed regulations to implement the requirements of
section 4(b)(2)(K) of the Act (as added by section 122(3) of this Act).
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and after
completion of a process of not less than 60 days for notice and opportunity for public
comment, the Secretary shall publish final regulations under this subsection.
(b)(1) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 9,
1984], the Secretary shall publish interim model guidelines to encourage the establish-
ment within health-care facilities of committees which would serve the purposes of edu-
cating hospital personnel and families of disabled infants with life-threatening conditions,
recommending institutional policies and guidelines concerning the withholding of medi-
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the "Baby Doe" regulations. Although the Amendments have many positive
aspects, 10 3 they lack effective enforcement provisions and as such will fail to
prevent discrimination against handicapped infants.
0 4
Initially, the Amendments define the unlawful denial of life-saving
treatment for disabled infants.' 5 Under the Amendments, it is unlawful to
withhold food, water, nutrients or medication from newborn infants.'0 6
Such prohibition is necessary to prevent cases such as "Infant Doe"' 0 7 and
the "Oklahoma Experiment"'0 8 from reoccurring. Also, this provision di-
rectly contravenes the position held by some doctors who espouse active
euthanasia to hasten the death of disabled infants. 0 9 In addition, the
Amendments mandate "medically indicated treatment" for infants with
"life-threatening" conditions." 0 However, an infant in need of immediate
medical treatment may be excluded from treatment if, in the physician's
"reasonable medical judgment," the denial of treatment is warranted."'
.As a result of the current diversity in medical opinion on the issue of
treatment, the advice of physicians can vary immensely."' The Amend-
ments allow physicians, exercising "reasonable medical judgment," to with-
cally indicated treatment (as that term is defined in clause (3) of section 3 of the Act (as
added by section 121(3) of this Act) from such infants, and offering counsel and review
in cases involving disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and after
completion of a period of not less than 60 days for notice and opportunity for public
comment, the Secretary shall publish the model guidelines.
Id. at § 5103 note (Supp. 1986).
103. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
104. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102. See also supra notes 59-79 and accom-
panying text.
105. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
106. Id.
107. In re Treatment and Care of Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A, slip op. at 2
(Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition, de-
nied, sub nom State of Indiana ex rel Infant Doe v. Monroe Circuit Court, No. 482 S 140
(Ind. Apr. 14, 1982), appeal dismissed, sub nom. In re Guardianship of Infant Doe, No. 1-782
A 157 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1983), petition for transfer denied, No. 1-782 A 157 (Ind. June
15, 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394.
108. Gross, supra note 21.
109. See supra notes 31-34. See also Freeman, Is There a Right to Die - Quickly? 80
J. PEDIAT. 904, 905 (1972) ("[in those rare instances where the decision has been made to
avoid 'heroic' measures and to allow 'nature to take its course,' should society not allow physi-
cians to alleviate the pain and suffering and help nature take its course-quickly?"); Reid,
Spina Bifada: The Fate of the Untreated, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 16, 19 (Aug. 1977) ("It
is not a valid argument that man has managed without euthanasia for most of his civilized
existence and therefore should continue to manage without it. . . .When ethical values be-
come no longer acceptable, they must be replaced.").
110. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
Ill. Child Abuse Amendment, supra note I1.
112. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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hold treatment from handicapped infants in three situations: (1) when the
infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (2) when treatment would
prolong dying; (3) when treatment would be inhumane. " ' The language
"reasonable medical judgment" suffers from the same vagueness problem as
the language found in the "Baby Doe" regulations.1 1 4 Since the term "rea-
sonable medical judgment" is not clearly defined under the Amendments, it
is subject to broad interpretation. " As such, the physician is allowed great
deference in making decisions affecting disabled newborns. " 6 Other proce-
dural safeguards are similarly lacking." 7
The Child Abuse Amendments granted decision-making power to the
same agencies which had proven ineffective in prohibiting discrimination
against disabled infants in the "Baby Doe" regulations. " 8 The Amend-
ments require state child abuse agencies receiving federal funds to establish
procedures or programs to report instances of denial of medical treat-
ment. ""' They also require HHS to issue regulations to implement the
Amendments and to publish model guidelines for voluntary hospital review
committees.' In as much as these reporting agencies have proven ineffec-
tive in the past,12 ' they are not now likely to provide effective procedural
safeguards for the infant denied immediate medical treatment.
State child abuse agencies have traditionally been in a mutually depen-
dent relationship with the medical profession.' 22 As such, it is likely that
state child abuse agencies will merely defer to the attending physician, thus
nullifying the Amendments' reporting provisions. In addition, HHS has, in
the past, failed to respond to reports of treatment denial for disabled in-
fants. 3 Hospital review committees have also failed to prohibit discrimina-
tion against disabled infants. 24 In fact, they are often the discriminating
party.' 15 As a result, whether an infant receives life-saving treatment and
survives, 26 or is denied this treatment and allowed to die,'27 will depend
113. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 11.
114. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(3), (4) (1985). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(B)(3) (Supp.
1986).
115. 45 C.F.R. Part 1340 App. (1985).
116. Campbell & Duff, supra note 8, at 893-94.
117. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102.
118. Id. See also supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
119. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 64 and 67.
123. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 31, 70 and 72 and accompanying text.
125. See Gross, supra note 70 and accompanying text.
126. See McLone, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
127. Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with Meningomyelocele in
INFANTICIDE 69, 70 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan, eds. 1982) ("If the meningomyelocele (spina
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more on the treating physician's personal medical views than on the
Amendments' seemingly protective provisions.
Although the Amendments were a key step in a long struggle to pro-
hibit the denial of life-saving treatment for infants, 12 8 the agencies granted
decision-making power by the Amendments are not likely to protect the
handicapped newborn from discrimination.12 The Amendments allow the
physician great deference in making the decision to treat the infant or allow
the infant to die under one of the Amendment's exceptions.13 0 The Amend-
ments' enforcement provisions had proven ineffective in past regulations in
protecting the infant from discrimination;131 thus, the question of whether
the Amendments have provided constitutionally adequate procedures for
the handicapped infant denied life-saving medical treatment is raised.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Procedural due process is required by the fifth amendment whenever a
federal government action attempts to deprive "any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."1 ' 2 The fifth amendment requires that
the Child Abuse Amendments provide adequate procedural due process for
the handicapped infant denied life-saving medical treatment."33 A determi-
nation of whether the Child Abuse Amendments have violated the due pro-
cess clause requires a two-part analysis. First, it must be shown that the
disabled newborn denied life-saving treatment has a constitutionally pro-
tected interest at stake.134 Secondly, it must be demonstrated that the
bifada) child is left untreated . . . then the mortality rate ranges from 90-100 percent in the
first year or two of life.") Id.
128. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
129. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
130. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note I1.
131. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102. See also supra notes 59-79 and accom-
panying text.
132. The fifth amendment states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life . . . without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property". Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445,
450-52 (1977). "The essence of a procedural due process complaint,-it builds in such a large
margin of probable mistake as itself to be intolerable in a humane society." Id. See also
Monaghan, Of "Liberty and Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Tribe, Structural
Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Note, Entitlement, Enjoyment and
Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89 (1974).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
134. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students may not be temporarily suspended
without minimum procedures); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (a preliminary hear-
ing required at place of arrest for parole violation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hear-
ing required before a driver's license was revoked); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sniadach v. Family Financing Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (before garnishing a wage earner's
salary a prior hearing was necessary).
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Amendments had failed to adequately protect that interest.13 5 Then, if the
Amendments are determined to have impaired the handicapped infant's
protected interest, the issue becomes what process is due 13 6 to ensure full
protection for the infant denied life-saving medical treatment based on his
handicap. Thus, to determine whether the Amendments have violated the
handicapped infant's constitutional due process rights, this two-part analy-
sis must be applied.
A. Handicapped Infants' Constitutionally Protected Interest
The handicapped infant denied immediate life-saving medical treat-
ment has a life interest at stake.137 The infant has a constitutional right to
life which vests at birth."8 In Roe v. Wade,139 the Court held that from the
moment of live birth there exists a human being entitled to the fullest pro-
tection of the law and the most basic rights enjoyed by every human be-
ing.14 0 Therefore, the handicapped infant as a human being possesses a
right which must be afforded full constitutional protection.
The handicapped infant also has a right to life-saving treatment. " Al-
though the right is not expressly stated in the Constitution, the Child Abuse
Amendments ground the right to life-saving treatment in a federal law.
4 2
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,"3 the Supreme Court held
that while the legislature may elect not to confer an interest, it may not
constitutionally authorize deprivation of such an interest once conferred
without procedural safeguards. 4 4 The legislature elected to confer a right
to immediate medical treatment for handicapped infants when they enacted
the Child Abuse Amendments." 5 Therefore, the legislature may not consti-
tutionally exclude an infant from life-saving treatment without adequate
procedures. '
135. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
136. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (refusal to pay for an indigent's blood group-
ing test violated due process); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas
and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (the utility customer's interest in continued service
and the not insubstantial "risk of computer errors" and erroneous terminations outweighed the
efficiency interests of the government utility); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
137. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). See also supra note 27.
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. Id. at 157.
141. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
142. See Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 102 (1982) (the hallmark of property is an individual enti-
tlement grounded in a federal or a state law).
143. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
144. Id. at 1493.
145. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 10.
146. See Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1493 (the right to due process is conferred by consti-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss1/5
CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS
B. Constitutionally Adequate Procedures
In order to determine whether the dictates of procedural protection
have been met by the Child Abuse Amendments, a balancing test must be
applied to the Amendments. In Mathews v. Eldridge,4 7 the Court requires
consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute safeguards; and (3) the fiscal or administrative costs of the sub-
stitute procedures. 4 8
First, in applying the Eldridge""' balancing test to the Child Abuse
Amendments, the strength of handicapped infants' interest must be evalu-
ated. The infant denied immediate life-saving treatment has a life interest
at stake. 150 The handicapped infant erroneously included in one of the
Amendments' three exceptions to treatment will be allowed to die.'5 There-
fore, the newborn's individual interest at stake is at its highest.
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the handicapped in-
fant's life through the procedures contained in the Child Abuse Amend-
ments are also at their highest. The Amendments allow physicians exercis-
ing "reasonable medical judgment" to withhold treatment from a
newborn."' Because the treatment of disabled newborns is subject to much
debate in the medical profession, " the attending physician's decisions to
withhold treatment based on "reasonable medical judgment" depends on
his personal and professional views. Since the Amendments grant decision-
making power to the same agencies that had proved ineffective in the
"Baby Doe" regulations, the infant is not protected from this discrimina-
tion. 54 The additional value of substitute procedures would be to prevent
discrimination against infants based on their handicap.155
The last factor in the Eldridge'" balancing test as applied to the
Amendments is the fiscal costs of the substitute procedures for the govern-
ment. Since the infant's life is at stake, 5 7 even if the costs were as great as
tutional guarantee, not by legislative grace).
147. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
148. Id. at 321.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
152. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note II.
153. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
154. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102. See also supra notes 59-79 and accom-
panying text.
155. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
156. 424 U.S. at 347.
157. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
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the costs of providing prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to ensure
fairness of a criminal procedure, the cost would not be too high.15 8 The
government's interests are not served by an erroneous decision, especially
where an individual's constitutional right to life is involved.159
The handicapped infant has a constitutional right to adequate proce-
dural safeguards. 60 The application of the Eldridge' balancing test dem-
onstrates that procedural protection has not been provided by the agencies
granted decision-making power in the Amendments. Therefore, the Child
Abuse Amendments should provide the newborn substitute procedures
which will guarantee the handicapped infant his constitutional right to pro-
cedural due process. 62
WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
The fifth amendment guarantees the handicapped infant due process
and fair treatment. 6 3 Therefore, to protect the infant from discrimination
in the decision-making process, the infant has a right to a prior evidentiary
hearing, T' appointed counsel,1 65 a "clear and convincing" evidence stan-
dard "'66 and a record of the proceedings. 7 Such substitute procedures are
essential for full constitutional protection of the disabled infant denied
treatment.
Due process requires a prior evidentiary hearing when the decision to
be made involves an "immediately desperate" situation.' 68 For example, in
Goldberg v. Kelly,'"6 the Court found an "immediately desperate" situation
where a welfare recipient denied benefits was deprived of his very means to
live. Based on this crucial factor, a prior evidentiary hearing was man-
dated. 70 Because a handicapped infant who is denied life-saving treatment
also faces an "immediately desperate"' 7' situation, the disabled infant
158. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
159. See Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1495.
160. Id. at 1493.
161. 424 U.S. at 321.
162. See Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. at 1493.
163. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
164. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
165. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
166. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
167. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; but cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (The dissent disagrees with the majority that a review of the record would establish
whether a defendant, proceeding without counsel, has suffered an unfair disadvantage).
168. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
169. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
170. Id. at 266-271.
171. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 21
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should likewise be granted a prior evidentiary hearing.
Due process requires the appointment of counsel when a person's own
liberty is at stake.1 7 2 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,'17 the
Court held that appointed counsel was necessary for indigents when they
stood to lose their liberty. 17' However, the disabled newborn may lose more
than his liberty, he may lose his life. Also, counsel should be appointed
when there is great disparity between the parties, 7 5 when the issues are
complex and when the loss is irrevocable.77 There is great disparity be-
tween the disabled newborn and the decision-makers. 7 7 Legal and medical
issues involved in a denial of life-saving treatment are very complex. Be-
cause the infant who is denied immediate treatment may lose his life, the
infant's loss is irrevocable,' 8 Accordingly, appointed counsel would ensure
the handicapped newborn his constitutional right to be heard. 7 9 Therefore,
a disabled infant should be appointed counsel.
When official action imperils an interest of great magnitude, such as
loss of life, due process requires a "clear and convincing" evidence stan-
dard.' 80 In Addington v. Texas,' the Court held an indigent's interest in
the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding to be of "great weight." In
light of the risk of error, the Court held that due process requires more
substantial evidence then a mere preponderance. The Court insisted on a
"clear and convincing" evidence standard.'82 Similarly, the infant's interest
in the decision of whether immediate medical treatment is withheld is of
"great weight."' 83 Due to the risk of error in the decision-making process,
life-saving treatment should not be denied unless the medical evidence is
"clear and convincing."
A record of the decision-making proceedings should also be kept, so
that courts can conduct a retrospective review of the transcript to ensure a
high standard of decision-making practices.'" As such, the proceeding held
172. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
173. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
174. Id. at 25.
175. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30.
176. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. See Gross, supra notes 21 and 70.
178. See supra notes 77 and 127 and accompanying text.
179. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
180. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-432 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769
(1982) (due to the high risk of error a "clear and convincing" standard of evidence must be
mandated).
181. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
182. Id. at 427, 433.
183. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
184. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271; but cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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to determine whether a handicapped infant should be included in one of the
Amendment's exceptions, thereby denied immediate life-saving treatment,
should be recorded. A transcript of the deliberations should be kept, includ-
ing a synopsis of any other treatment cases considered relevant to the deci-
sion at hand. The medical evidence offered for or against treatment should
be recorded.185 In this way, a record of the proceedings would provide the
reviewing court with information as to whether the handicapped infant was
afforded appropriate procedural safeguards.
In summary, the Child Abuse Amendments should include the follow-
ing procedures: (1) a prior evidentiary hearing to provide a neutral fact-
finder; 86 (2) appointed counsel to provide the infant a voice in the proceed-
ings;' a  (3) a "clear and convincing" evidence standard to avoid an errone-
ous decision;188 and (4) a record of the proceedings to ensure adequate re-
view. Therefore, the portions of the Child Abuse Amendments which grant
decision-making power to the Department of Health and Human Services,
state child abuse agencies receiving federal funds and voluntary hospital
review boards 89 should be stricken. In lieu thereof, the following binding
enforcement procedures should be inserted:
Section One: Prior Evidentiary Hearing 9 '
(A) Before a decision is made to withhold life-saving treat-
ment, a prior evidentiary hearing must be held.
(1) In cases of myelomingocele (spina bifada), a
prior evidentiary hearing must be held within 24
hours; '
185. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Office of Human Development Services, Ser-
vices and Treatment for Disabled Infants; Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to
Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,896, (Model Guidelines). These
suggestions were the subject of some controversy during the comment period, as discussed in
Bopp & Balch, supra note 12, at 126.
From one perspective, commentators urged that records not be available to govern-
ment agencies and others outside the hospital. From another perspective, it was suggested
that tapes or written minutes be made for each meeting and transmitted to the [state
child protection agencies] for review. [The Department of Health and Human Services]
rejected both views.
Bopp & Balch, supra note 12, at 126.
186. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
187. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25, 30; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 45-46 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
188. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 431-32.
189. Child Abuse Amendments, supra note 102.
190. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
191. Brown & McLone, Treatment Choices for the Infant with Meningomyelocele, in
INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 69, 71 (M. Delahoyd & D. Horan eds. 1982)
(The spina bifada infant's open sac should be closed within twenty-four hours. The failure to
close the sac within twenty-four hours will result in irreparable harm.)
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss1/5
CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS
(2) In all other cases, which range from Down's
Syndrome to anecephal, a prior evidentiary hear-
ing must be held within the time limit mandated
by specific physical symptoms; 92
(3) Appointed counsel must be provided timely and
adequate notice of the proceeding;'9 3
(4) Appointed counsel will be provided an opportu-
nity to present medical evidence in favor of the
handicapped infant;'9 4
(5) Appointed counsel will be given the opportunity
to confront adverse witnesses; 95 and
(6) Appointed counsel will have an opportunity to
present an oral argument on behalf of the handi-
capped infant."'
Section Two: Appointed Counsel
(A) Counsel should be appointed to advocate for the hand-
icapped infant's life interest. 7
(1) Appointed counsel will gather and present medi-
cal evidence on behalf of the handicapped in-
fant; 98 and
(2) Appointed counsel will identify the material is-
sues involved.' 99
Section Three: "Clear and Convincing" Evidence
(A) Before the decision is made to withhold life-saving
medical treatment from a handicapped infant, the medical
evidence must be "clear and convincing. "200
Section Four: Records
(A) Records of the proceedings at which the decision to
withhold immediate life-saving treatment must be main-
tained,20 ' including but not limited to:
(1) summary descriptions of specific cases consid-
192. (i.e. "Infant Doe" needed surgery to correct a blocked esophagus and thereby allow
food to reach his stomach. The failure to treat the infant resulted in his death within six days.)
193. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
194. Id. at 269.
195. Id. at 269-270.
196. Id. at 268-69.
197. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
198. Id. at 30.
199. Id. at 45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-32.
201. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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ered in the decision; 20 2
(2) medical evidence presented for and against ac-
tive treatment.2 0 3
CONCLUSION
As a result of the conflict between the handicapped infant's parents,
the state and the medical community regarding the handicapped infant's
right to immediate life-saving treatment, in significant numbers handi-
capped infants have been allowed to die. In response, the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 were signed into law.
Admittedly, the Amendments were a key step in the long struggle to
ensure immediate life-saving treatment for handicapped newborns. How-
ever, the Amendments granted decision-making power to the Department
of Health and Human Services, state child abuse agencies and voluntary
hospital review committees. These agencies had previously proven ineffec-
tive in preventing discrimination against newborns. As a result, the Amend-
ments failed to adequately protect the handicapped infants' constitutional
right to life.
Accordingly, the legislature should now 'take the second step in the
struggle to protect the handicapped infant from treatment denial. The in-
fant denied life-saving treatment should be provided a prior evidentiary
hearing, appointed counsel, protected by a "clear and convincing" standard
of evidence and afforded a record of the proceedings. These procedures
would guarantee the handicapped infant his constitutional due process
rights. To do any less would allow thousands of future handicapped infants
to die.
PATRICIA K. CAULFIELD
202. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271.
203. A record of the decision-making proceedings should be kept so the fairness of the
decision can be reviewed.
[Vol. 21
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol21/iss1/5
